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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15–2002 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 GELEAN MARK, 
 
                   Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. No. 3-05-cr-00076-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 16, 2016 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  December 19, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Gelean Mark appeals his judgment of sentence, claiming the District Court erred 
in calculating his criminal history under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(USSG). We will affirm.  
I  
 Mark was indicted in 2005 for his role in “Redball I,” a conspiracy to possess and 
distribute large amounts of cocaine in St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands. Mark’s 
first trial ended in a mistrial. He was tried again in February 2009 and the jury found him 
guilty on two counts of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. 
 The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) which 
calculated Mark’s offense level as 33 and his criminal history category as III, resulting in 
an advisory Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months’ incarceration. Mark objected to the 
PSR and the Probation Office issued a revised PSR that reduced Mark’s criminal history 
category to I, yielding a new Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months. At the sentencing 
hearing, the Government objected to the reduction in Mark’s criminal history score and, 
after hearing argument from both sides, the District Court agreed with the Government, 
reinstating Mark’s criminal history category as III. The parties then agreed that Mark’s 
correct offense level was 31, resulting in a final advisory Guidelines range of 135 to 168 
months’ incarceration. The Court imposed a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence and Mark 
filed this timely appeal. 
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II1 
The issue on appeal is whether Mark’s criminal history properly included two 
prior sentences. The first sentence, imposed on October 7, 2010, arose out of the “Mark-
Blyden” RICO enterprise, which was engaged in narcotics distribution, unlawful 
gambling, and attempted murder. The second sentence, imposed on October 19, 2010, 
was for Mark’s role in “Redball II,” a conspiracy aimed at smuggling cocaine out of the 
Virgin Islands on commercial airlines and distributing it throughout the mainland United 
States. As Mark acknowledges, we “review for clear error the District Court's 
determination of what constitutes ‘relevant conduct’ for purposes of sentencing.” United 
States v. West, 643 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoted in Mark Br. at 8). 
The Sentencing Guidelines state that a “‘prior sentence’ means any sentence 
previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for conduct not part of the instant 
offense.” USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Mark argues that his RICO and Redball 
II sentences should not have counted because his conduct in those cases was part of his 
conduct in the case under review. We disagree. 
First, Mark does not persuade us that the conduct underlying his prior convictions 
was in fact part of the instant offense. Rather, he compares the cases at a high level of 
abstraction to draw vague connections. For example, Mark argues that “[i]n all three 
cases, the activity involved purchasing, transporting, importing and selling cocaine” and 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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that in all cases the defendants “utilized phones to communicate,” “employed code 
words,” and “drove in cars to conduct drop offs.” Mark Br. 12. He also notes that the 
schemes involved some of the same defendants and overlapped in time. That the three 
crimes share these similarities—many of which would occur in most cocaine conspiracy 
cases—is not enough to show clear error. Cf. United States v. Washington, 549 F.3d 905, 
920–21 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that conduct from a prior conviction was not part of 
the same offense because the two crimes were not “inextricably linked” or “operationally 
connected”). 
 Nor does Mark explain how the District Court’s analysis was clearly erroneous. In 
comparing the RICO case to this case, the District Court explained that there was 
insufficient evidence of a common scheme between the two crimes. Specifically, the 
Court noted the variation in “[t]he MO, the motive, [and] the substantive offense 
committed” between the two crimes. App. 97; see also App. 96 (Government explaining 
to the District Court, “the underlying offenses that the government had to prove in [the 
RICO case] had to do with gambling, the dogfighting and the attempted murder, [and] the 
weapons case.”). The Court did not clearly err when it found significant the disparate 
motives, methods, and substantive offenses of the two crimes.   
 As for Mark’s sentence in the Redball II case, the District Court rightly considered 
it “a closer call.” App. 97. Yet despite the fact that the Redball conspiracies had similar 
participants and involved the sale of cocaine, there was not “a preponderance that there 
[was] a common plan between the two, . . . or that the defendant intended the second 
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would be committed as a consequence of the first, or that the offenses were jointly 
planned.” Id. And as the Government noted at sentencing, we had previously ruled that 
the two conspiracies had different objectives. App. 95; United States v. Mark, 284 F. 
App’x 946, 949 (3d Cir. 2008). Specifically, “the conspiracy alleged in Redball I aimed 
to possess large quantities of cocaine, crack, and marijuana with intent to distribute the 
drugs on the streets of St. Thomas for financial gain,” while the Redball II conspiracy 
sought “to possess large quantities of cocaine for distribution in New York and North 
Carolina for financial gain.” Mark, 284 F. App’x at 949 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  
Apart from Mark’s objections that we have already rejected, he does not explain 
how the District Court’s analysis was clearly erroneous. In sum, despite some similarities 
between the cases, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007).  
*  *  * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
